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Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and 
is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined 
individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In 
the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture 
predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede’s model of cultural values, three nation-level analyses of data from 25, 
19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 
2b, N  =  30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross-
sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual-level measures of Hofstede’s values, 
replicated these findings. A meta-analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive 
links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; 
.59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also 
play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.
KEY WORDS: conspiracist beliefs, cultural values, situated cognition, collectivism, masculinity, cross-cultural
Conspiracy theories (CT) are beliefs that significant events are the result of malevolent actions 
from powerful groups who “pull the strings” behind the scenes (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 2017). 
Research indicates a high prevalence of CTs across both Western and non-Western countries (van 
Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Far from being innocuous, CTs can have negative consequences such 
as a reduced willingness to vaccinate children (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), to take action to mitigate 
climate change (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and to endorse unwarranted beliefs such as creationism 
(Wagner-Egger, Delouvée, Gauvrit, & Dieguez, 2018), and they may even increase discrimination 
toward stigmatized groups (Jolley, Meleady, & Douglas, 2020). Psychological research has exten-
sively investigated individual differences and motivational and emotional states as well as contextual 
factors associated with belief in CTs (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). However, psychological sci-
ence has hitherto ignored the role of culture, a void in the literature that we set out to fill.
Individual Differences, Motivation, and Conspiracy Theories
One approach to CTs focuses on individual difference predictors of CT (e.g., Swami et al., 
2011) and identifies several traits that predict them. Converging evidence highlights links between 
CTs and a wide range of personality-social cognitive constructs. First, CTs correlate negatively with 
personality traits like “Agreeableness” (Swami et al., 2011) and positively with schizotypy (Holm, 
2009) and paranoid ideation (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; see Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, 
& Imhoff, 2013). Second, CTs positively correlate with other belief systems including social domi-
nance (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), right-wing authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
& Sanford, 1950; Bruder et al., 2013), and political cynicism (Swami et al., 2011). Other lines of 
investigation show that CTs adherence is lower among individuals with high analytical reasoning and 
high moral orientation towards epistemic rationality (Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018; Swami, Voracek, 
Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014).
However, one of the strongest predictors of adherence to one CT is the degree to which indi-
viduals adhere to other CTs (Goertzel, 1994; Sutton & Douglas, 2014; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 
2007), even if those beliefs were artificially created for experimental purposes (Swami et al., 2011). 
This has led researchers to believe that CTs might be the reflection of a higher order, more general 
type of cognitive style: in other words, a “conspiracy mentality” (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).
With that view in mind, research has shifted towards motivational components that drive ad-
herence to CTs. In that framework, CTs are conceptualized as beliefs which stem from psycho-
logical mechanisms pertaining to threat regulation and that individuals use in uncertain situations. 
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According to the motivated cognition approach to CTs (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016; Saunders, 
2017), CTs are motivated by a need to reduce uncertainty (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 
2018) and to restore a meaningful view over ambiguous situations for regaining control in the face 
of unexpected/threatening events (Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015; see Douglas et al., 2017 for a 
review).
This threat-regulation theory of CTs is supported by converging evidence of positive links be-
tween CTs and death-related anxiety (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011), need for order (Abalakina-
Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Swami, 2012), and even preference for Manichean narratives, 
(i.e., simplified teleological accounts of complex random events; Oliver & Wood, 2014). In line with 
these findings, experimental investigations have shown that threats to control (van Prooijen & Acker, 
2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and identity (Graeupner & Coman, 2017) increase CTs.
What About Culture?
Research so far has thus identified three types of motivations that predict belief in CT: epistemic 
(i.e., understanding one’s environment), existential (i.e., feeling safe and in control) and social (i.e., 
belonging to a group). In sum, belief in CTs is linked with uncertainty reduction needs and increases 
under threats pertaining to control and social belonging (Douglas et al., 2017).
However, motivational processes do not occur in a social vacuum, especially since they are af-
fected by individuals’ cultural context (Oyserman, 2016). Accordingly, there is ample evidence for 
the existence of cross-cultural differences in motivations (Kwon, Saluja, & Adaval, 2015; Lin, Lin, 
& Han, 2008; Mammarella, & Fairfield, 2013). For instance, collectivistic values priming increases 
reliance on stereotypical information in word recognition tasks (Saluja, Adaval, & Wyer, 2017) and 
individualistic values priming facilitates complex task solution (Oyserman, 2017). Therefore, it 
would be expected that culture plays an important role in shaping CTs. Yet, research so far has not 
tested this hypothesis.
To examine how culture may influence belief in CTs, we use culture-as-situated cognition 
theory (CSCT; Oyserman, 2016), which posits that individuals’ motivational states and cognitions 
(including beliefs) are activated depending on the surrounding cultural context. Namely, different 
cultural contexts activate some cultural values more than others, leading to cross-cultural differences 
in mindsets and motivations of entire populations (Oyserman, 2016). In accordance with CSCT, we 
hypothesize that cultural values may also be associated with CT beliefs because of the different kinds 
of motivations these values activate. Cultural values should be differently linked with CTs depending 
on their content and their links with the above-mentioned classes of motives (which underlie CTs). 
To test this hypothesis, we used Hofstede’s well established six-values model of culture (Hofstede, 
1984).
These six values are power distance (PD; the extent to which members of a society accept unequal 
power distributions), individualism (ID; a preference for loose social structures in which individuals 
mostly take care of themselves and their relatives), masculinity (MS; emphasizing achievement and 
competitiveness over cooperation and consensus), uncertainty avoidance (UA; how much members 
of a given society are uneased by uncertainty/ambiguity), long-term orientation (LTO; low LTO so-
cieties prefer to maintain traditions and view societal change with suspicion; high LTO societies are 
more socially liberal) and indulgence (IN; the degree to which societies allow free gratification of 
basic human drives linked with hedonism; see Hofstede, 2011).
This model was chosen for three main reasons. First, it is more parsimonious than Schwartz’s 
(1990), which comprises an array of 10 values. This means less tests would be conducted, lowering 
the probability of false positives in this original investigation. Second, there is no firm consensus 
regarding isomorphism between individual-level and nation-level values in Hofstede’s model (see 
Fischer, Vauclair, Fontaine, & Schwartz, 2010). Thus, we think that demonstrating a link between 
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individual outcomes and a national-level value model that is theoretically unrelated to individu-
al-level values would provide a stronger demonstration of the influence of macrosocial factors 
over a psychological phenomenon (because it partially rules out value isomorphism as a potential 
confound). The last reason pertains to issues with theoretical relevance. While other models point 
at many interesting cultural values (e.g., relational mobility, Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010; tight-
ness-looseness, Gelfand et al., 2011), we could not make straightforward predictions from them with 
regards to CTs prevalence. Overall, we found a superior methodological and theoretical relevance of 
Hofstede’s model in the specific context of predicting adherence to CTs (with such values as power 
distance or uncertainty avoidance).
Hypotheses
As can be seen from the values identified in this model, some do have immediate implications 
for CTs (e.g., uncertainty avoidance). However, others might be more remotely related to CTs at 
first glance (e.g., masculinity). Moreover, all of them fit within categories of the motivational clas-
sification established by Douglas et al. (2017). Power distance, individualism, and masculinity all 
pertain to ways to relate to others within societies (between groups or individuals) and may thus tap 
into social motives. Uncertainty avoidance is linked with epistemic motives, while both long-term 
orientation and indulgence relate to existential motives (what worldview should prevail in a society; 
what meaning and goals should be assigned to life and rewarded). Based on the most up-to-date un-
derstanding of the motivational processes at play behind CTs, we therefore specified the hypotheses 
listed below.
Social Motives: Related Values
H1: Power Distance (PD, cultural tendency to accept hierarchy). Recent studies have shown that 
adherence to CTs is also underpinned by the need to make sense of one’s societal structure and 
to rationalize it.
Several clues lead one to think that PD could be a predictor of CTs beliefs. First, as it is the 
case for populism (Staerklé & Green, 2018), there is a vertical dimension in most CTs accusing 
the elites (politicians, governments, secret services, etc.; see Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007), al-
though some CTs accuse some minorities (Uenal, 2016) or outgroups (Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 
2009). Further, the believers in CTs accusing the powerful elites are more often "losers" (speaking 
descriptively, not pejoratively), that is, defeated and excluded individuals in society, who are located 
on the lower levels of social status (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Congruent with this analysis, studies 
often report a negative correlation between CTs beliefs and educational level (see, for example, van 
Prooijen, 2017) and with feelings of anomia (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Green & Douglas, 2018; Wagner-
Egger & Bangerter, 2007).
Moreover, CTs display positive correlations with social dominance orientation (i.e., the tendency 
to endorse social hierarchies, Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; see Bruder et al., 2013; Green & Douglas, 
2018) Because of this, and since belief in CTs are positively linked with loss of control and power-
lessness (Douglas et al., 2017), they should be positively correlated with PD.
H2: Individualism (ID, cultural preference for loose social structures). The sum of empirical 
evidence available on CTs indicate that they might stem from an evolved mechanism for de-
tecting malevolent coalitions (see van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Because collectivistic values 
motivate individuals to focus on relational explanations for attributing causality to ambiguous 
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events (see Oyserman, 2016), they should also tap into that mechanism more often, generating a 
higher “proneness” to explanations of the CTs type. Recent experimental evidence partially cor-
roborates this hypothesis by showing a positive effect of collectivism on ingroup vigilance (the 
tendency to attribute negative intentions to others; see Liu, Morris, Talhelm, & Yang, 2019). In 
addition, CTs are more prevalent among groups which are known to have more interdependent 
(i.e., collectivistic) selves (such as ethnic minorities; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; van Prooijen, 
Staman, & Krouwel, 2018). Furthermore, individualistic cultures promote more analytic think-
ing style (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), which reduces CT beliefs (Swami et al., 
2014). Thus, ID should be negatively linked with belief in CTs.
H3: Masculinity (MS, emphasis on competitiveness over cooperation). MS increases competi-
tion and intergroup conflicts, which are associated with belief in CTs (see Jolley et al., 2019). 
Moreover, competitive contexts generated by MS are also known to trigger increased ingroup 
vigilance (the effect of collectivism on ingroup vigilance vanishes when cooperative contexts 
are made salient; Liu et al., 2019). MS should therefore be positively linked with CTs.
Epistemic Motives: Related Values
H4: Uncertainty Avoidance (UA, cultural preference for certainty). This value is directly linked 
with the epistemic motives at play behind adherence to CTs. Because uncertainty management 
predicts CT beliefs (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013), UA should be positively linked with CTs.
Existential Motives: Related Values
H5: Long-Term Orientation (LTO, emphasis on social change vs. maintaining traditions). A lot 
of studies found that CTs are linked with political conservatism (Bruder et al., 2013; Grzesiak-
Feldman & Irzycka, 2009; Hart & Graether, 2018; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 
2018; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007). Hence, as high LTO entail more openness to social 
change and less willingness to maintain traditions, it should be thus negatively correlated with 
political conservatism and CTs endorsement.
H6: Indulgence (IN, valuing hedonism). CTs have repeatedly been observed as related to the 
feelings of anxiety (Green & Douglas, 2018; Hart & Graether, 2018; Newheiser et al., 2011; 
Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007). Thus, they should be negatively linked with IN (increased 
hedonism), although there is no firm theoretical rationale for this hypothesis.
Method
Overview
To test our hypotheses and provide robust first evidence for a link between cultural values and 
CT beliefs, we conducted three studies. The first three studies were cross-cultural investigations of 
how cultural values measured at the nation level are associated with prevalence of belief in CTs. 
Study 1 was a first exploratory test using conspiracy worldview (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 
2013), also measured at the nation level. It was followed by two subsequent investigations using CTs 
about the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Study 2a; 19 countries) and with the tendency to believe conspiracy 
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theories (Study 2b; 18 countries) measured at the individual level this time. The third study was a 
within-culture investigation of how cultural values measured at the individual level are associated 
with belief in specific CTs (e.g., 9/11, New World Order) and with a general tendency to believe 
conspiracy theories (Bruder et al., 2013). This strategy allowed us to rule out measurement level (i.e., 
ecological fallacy) and stimulus sampling as potential confounds driving the effects. All data under-
lying our findings are accessible on the Open Science Framework.1
Ethical Considerations
Studies 1 and 2a were strictly archival and did not require IRB approval from the authors’ insti-
tutions. Study 2b was also archival, but the data was collected in parallel for other research purposes 
by some of the authors of the current article. At Study 2b’s coordinator’s institution (JGU Mainz, 
Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee), studies that did not involve deception, vulnerable 
populations, identifiable data, intensive data, or interventions were exempt from ethical approval and 
not evaluated at time of data collection. For Study 2b’s second coordinator, the study fell under a 
cluster approval of studies involving these kinds of variable. Likewise, most other involved institu-
tions did not provide a review of ethics as this was a simple survey study. Where ethics were evalu-
ated,2 no issues were identified. Finally, Study 3 obtained approval from IRB3 at the University of 
Illinois (Chicago) where it was conducted.
All studies were conducted in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki declaration (WMO, 1964), 
its later amendments, and the 2016 APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 
(APA, 2017). As such, all participants provided their explicit consent to participate before data col-
lection and had the right to terminate participation at any time. No participant data was suppressed 




We reanalyzed data from a cross-cultural study investigating the link between CTs and atti-
tudes towards vaccines in 25 countries (see Hornsey, Harris, & Fielding, 2018). We crossed these 
data with Hofstede’s country scores (from 0 to 100) of the six-dimensional model of cultural values 
(based on data collected between 1967 and 2002; see Hofstede, 2011), and added national Human 
Development Index (HDI) scores as a control for country’s wealth, health, and education levels. The 
dataset includes only participants residing in the target countries and who had completed all survey 
items (N = 5323; over 200 per country; 50.07% men, Mage = 42.71, SD = 15.89; see Table S1 in the 
online supporting information).
The data were collected in 2016 and among the measures available, we used Hornsey’s et al. 
(2018) CTs scale as the outcome variable. Their measure was created using items from Lewandowsky 
et al. (2013) that investigators considered to be prevalent worldwide (i.e., conspiracies about the as-
sassination of President John Kennedy, the death of Princess Diana; the existence of a New World 
Order, and about the 9/11 terrorist attacks; 5-point Likert from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly 
agree”; α = .81). All other specific methodological details can be accessed in the online supporting 
1See https://osf.io/vxqe9/.
2University of Kent Ethics ID 201714894944604383; University of Bern Philosophisch-Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
#2016-02-00005; Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogy of Eötvös Loránd University approval 188/2017.
3#2019-0267
9Culture and Conspiracy Beliefs
information from the original study,4 and detailed description of the original procedure and results 
can be found in Hornsey et al. (2018).
Analytic Strategy
Though the study contained data from 5323 participants, we only had access to the country-level 
aggregated data (average scores from each national sample). Thus, we proceeded to OLS regression 
analyses with a N = 25 (number of countries). Though this sample size was suboptimal in terms of 
power to detect small- and medium-sized effects (below b = .4–.5), this first exploration would still 
be informative as to whether some cultural factors strongly relate to CTs.
Results
The average CTs score in our 25 countries sample was 3.02 (SD = 1.03). All continuous mea-
sures and indices were standardized (z-scores). Then, an OLS regression model (percentile bootstrap 
for 95% CI of estimates, N = 1000) was computed with CTs score rate as the dependent variable. The 
model had an adequate fit, F(7, 11) = 7.34, p < .001, and predicted a substantial amount of variance 
in CTs, adjusted-R2 = .63. It revealed a main negative effect of Individualism on CTs, b = −.22, 95% 
CI [−.37; −.07], p = .006 and a weaker positive trend for Masculinity b = .07, 95% CI [−.06; .18], 
p = .084 (see the online supporting information for the full model display). We then reran the model 
including National HDI as a covariate. The effect of individualism was not substantially impacted 
b = −.22, 95% CI [−.41; −.01], p =  .008, while that of Masculinity was weaker b =  .07, 95% CI 
[−.10; −.17], p = .11 (see Table 1). Therefore, the overall pattern of results lent empirical support 
for Hypothesis 2, weak evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3, and did not support all other hypotheses.
Discussion
This first investigation yielded preliminary evidence suggesting that Hofstede’s values may pre-
dict CT levels independently of “heavy” economic-demographic variables measured by the HDI 
index (which had no significant association with CT rates). However, there were numerous limita-
tions which impeded us from inferring much support for our hypotheses from these data. First, the 
4http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea00 00586.supp
Table 1. OLS Regression Model of CB According to Hofstede’s Six Cultural Values Adjusted for HDI (N = 25, 
Outcome = Conspiracy Beliefs Score)
Model Parameters
pSE t df b 95% CI
Hofstede values
PD (H1) .08 .02 22 .01 [−.21, .20] .99
ID (H2) .07 3.08 22 −.22** [−.41, −.01] .008
MS (H3) .04 1.68 22 .07 [−.10, .17] .11
UA (H4) .04 .83 22 .11 [−.16, .11] .42
LT (H5) .05 .03 22 −.01 [−.13, .11] .98
IN (H6) .05 .42 22 .08 [−.28, .13] .68
Covariates
HDI .06 1.23 22 −.24 [−.15, .32] .24
Note: SE  =  standard error, CI  =  confidence interval; HDI  =  Human Development Index; PD  =  Power Distance; 
ID = Individualism; MS = Masculinity; UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; LT = Long-Term Orientation; IN = Indulgence.
**p < .01.
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sample size was too small (N = 25). This may have led us to detect inflated effects for Individualism 
and Masculinity (or even false positives), while preventing us from detecting meaningful but small 
effects regarding other values. Moreover, the samples from which the data were obtained were lim-
ited in terms of population representativeness (with sample sizes around N = 200, see the online 
supporting information). In addition, it is not clear how Hornsey’s et al. (2018) CT scale items were 
selected. This may have introduced stimulus sampling biases (Wells, & Windschitl, 1999) since we 
cannot be sure that participants in the studies knew in details the various conspiracies mentioned in 
the scale (beyond hearsay). Thus, further studies had to be conducted using data at least partly mea-
sured at the individual level (to gain power) and relying on representative samples for each country 




We analyzed the 2008 World Public Opinion poll (consisting of nationally representative sam-
ples) about who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks (“International poll: No consensus on who was be-
hind 9/11,” 2008). Again, we crossed these data with Hofstede’s international country indices (see 
Hofstede, 2011; same as in Study 1). The final dataset includes only participants (1) who answered 
the question about the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and (2) who came from countries with cultural 
value scores (thus excluding one country: Palestine). This left us with a total sample size of 12,255 
(51.2% men, Mage = 39.82, SD = 15.52) from 19 countries. The World Public Opinion poll was con-
ducted during the summer of 2008 in different countries either by face-to-face or phone interviews. 
Our measure of CT belief was a single open-ended question related to the 9/11 attacks (“As you 
know, on September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked. Who do you think was behind the 
9/11 attacks?”). Answers involving al-Qaeda were coded as 0 (i.e., no conspiracy belief regarding 
the true identity of the 9/11 attacks’ perpetrators), while answers involving other groups that were 
not officially involved (e.g., U.S. government, Israel) were coded as 1 (belief in a conspiracy theory 
regarding the true identity of the 9/11 perpetrators). We also included national Human Development 
Index (HDI) scores from 2007 (see United Nations Development Programme, 2009) as a control for 
a country’s wealth, health, and education levels.
Analytic Strategy
Because of the spatial component of our data, concerns may be raised regarding the mutual 
independence of cultural values (predictors) and spatial clustering (correlation according to geog-
raphy; Fotheringham & Rogerson, 2008). However, our investigation focused on the links between 
nation-level characteristics and individual-level outcomes, which rendered complicated imple-
mentation of techniques to deal with clustering (e.g., with values measured at the individual level, 
the observed link between the two individual-level variables may be moderated by higher order 
cluster effects and properly accounted for in a multilevel model; Fotheringham & Rogerson, 2008; 
Schielzeth & Nakagawa, 2013). Moreover, geography, in the form of measured cultural values (thus 
cultural “areas”), was precisely the target of our investigation and thus could not be modeled as a 
random effect or controlled for, especially since each country had unique cultural value scores. This 
excluded conducting spatial regression or mixed-model analyses as a viable option.
On the other hand, clustering needed to be accounted for in the computation of standard errors to 
avoid grossly inflated Type I errors. One solution consists in simply conducting correlation analyses 
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on aggregated country data, but this would result in unacceptable power losses (down to N = number 
of countries = 18/19). We therefore conducted regression analyses of cultural values upon individual 
responses using cluster-robust standard errors (see Bryan & Jenkins, 2015) (Table 2).
Also, we expected that many predictors in the models would be significant at the p < .05 thresh-
old due to sample size alone. To lower the likelihood of interpreting false positives, we decided to 
set up a smallest effect size of interest (Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012). We followed Cohen’s (1988) 
guidelines specifying a minimum effect size of interest of d = .2 (or r = .10). Yet more recent per-
spectives on the meaningfulness of effect size point at the real-world relevance for effects of d = .10 
(or r = .05) magnitude (see Funder & Ozer, 2019), especially when studying variables (like culture) 
which affect outcomes over time through repeated exposure. Still, we argue that in the context of the 
present exploratory investigations using nonexperimental methods (including archival data), effect 
sizes might be inflated despite our large samples. In that context, a minimum effect size of d = .20 
constitutes a reasonable conservative option for interpreting the observed effects that would include 
effects which “real” size could be twice as small (i.e., d = .10).
Results
The overall mean CT belief rate in our 19 countries sample was 32.3%. All continuous measures 
and indices were standardized (z-scores). Next, a cluster-robust binary logistic regression model was 
computed with CT belief rate as the dependent variable. The model had an adequate fit, Wald’s F(7, 
11) = 3.70, p = .026, 70% classification accuracy, and predicted a substantial amount of variance in 
CT belief, Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R2 = .11. National HDI was adjusted (the unadjusted results were 
similar, but we wanted to provide the least inflated estimates of our parameters), and unadjusted 
results can be found in the online supporting information.
As expected, due to ambient noise alone, five out of the seven model variables (71%) were 
significantly below p = .05. Results are displayed in the upper half of Table 1. The overall pattern of 
relationships supports all hypotheses except for the relationships between Power Distance and CT 
belief. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. As predicted, we observed negative relationships 
between both Individualism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence with CT beliefs, which is con-
sistent with Hypotheses 2, 5, and 6, respectively. Similarly, we observed a positive relationship be-
tween Masculinity and CT belief, which was consistent with Hypothesis 3 and a positive relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and CT in line with Hypothesis 4.
Discussion
These further results provided support for Hypotheses 2 to 6, once again despite economic-de-
mographic variables measured by the HDI index. Here, however, the measure of CT beliefs was 
limited, given that it consisted in only one item pertaining to CT beliefs about the 9/11 attacks (i.e., 
stimulus sampling issues; Wells & Windschitl, 1999). Therefore, we conducted another study in 
18 countries, with a validated measure to assess participants’ conspiracist mindset (Conspiracist 
Mentality Questionnaire; Bruder et al., 2013).
Study 2b
Participants and Procedure
In this third study, we used data from 18 countries (which had cultural value scores) where the 
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) had been administered. The data was collected by the 
PiCOM consortium in 23 countries (N = 33,431), pooling resources from a large group of academic 
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researchers working on conspiracy theories. Specifically, consortium members were invited to run 
or include the CMQ in ongoing survey studies, aiming at representative samples in their respective 
countries, with a minimum of 300 respondents. The CMQ (Bruder et al., 2013) taps into a general 
tendency to believe in CTs and consists of five items for which participants have to assess the likeli-
hood 11-point Likert scale (e.g., “events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the 
result of secret activities”; from 1 “0% completely unlikely” to 11 “100% completely likely”). For 
the present study, total sample size was of 30,994 (44.68% men, Mage = 41.14, SD = 7.68) from 18 
countries. In nine countries, 50% participation included monetary incentives. As in Study 2a, we then 
merged these with Hofstede’s international country indices.
Analytic Strategy
Given that the data from Study 2b was structured as that from Study 2a, we had to implement the 
same analytic strategy and use cluster-robust regression analyses to test our hypotheses.
Results
The overall mean CMQ in our 18 countries sample was 6.44 (SD = 2.22), and reliability was 
adequate. All continuous measures and indices were standardized (z-scores). Next, a cluster-robust 
OLS regression model was computed with CMQ scores as the dependent variable. The model had 
adequate fit, Wald’s F(7, 12) = 25.04, p < .001, and predicted a substantial amount of variance in con-
spiracist mentality, R2 = .14. As in Study 2a, it was adjusted for national HDI (the unadjusted results 
were similar, but we wanted to provide the least inflated estimates of our parameters). Unadjusted 
results can be found in the online supporting information. This time, however, only two out of the 
seven model variables (28.5%) were significant below p = .05. Results can be seen in the lower half 
of Table 1. Unlike in Study 2a, this time only Individualism and Masculinity’s links with conspiracist 
mentality were significant, providing further evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3 only. We replicated 
the nonsignificant relationship between Power Distance and CTs from Study 2a. This time, however, 
we found no support linking conspiracist mentality with either Uncertainty Avoidance, Indulgence, 
or Long-Term Orientation.
Discussion
This third investigation allowed us to gain confidence in the existence of robust links between 
individualism and belief in CTs as well as between masculinity and CTs. But all studies so far were 
conducted using measures of Hofstede values at the nation level, which can still be biased. To avoid 
committing so-called ecological fallacies, we decided to conduct a fourth study to assess the links 
between self-reported endorsement of Hofstede’s values and several measures of belief in CTs.
STUDY 3
In this fourth study, we used a convenience sample and conducted a survey among 350 partici-
pants in the United States (> 250 to obtain stable correlation estimates; Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013) 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, for a $1.00 reimbursement. Participants took on average 8 minutes to 
complete the survey. Our final sample consisted of 350 U.S. citizens (Mage = 33.58, SD = 9.34; 66.7% 
women). Measures were presented in the following order (details of all scales can be found in the 
online supporting information).
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Conspiracy Mentality
Participants completed the CMQ (Bruder et al., 2013; M = 7.50, SD = 1.98, α = .88).
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale
Next, participants were asked to answer the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; 
Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). Like the CMQ which taps into a general “mindset,” the 
GCBS consists of a series of 15 statements about various “typologies” of CTs (e.g., “Secret organi-
zations communicate with extra-terrestrials, but keep this fact from the public”; 5-point Likert from 
1 [not true at all] to 5 [very true]; M = 3.08, SD = 1.01, α = .96).
Specific Conspiracy Beliefs Scale
Participants were then introduced to a series of eight items we designed to tap into real-world 
conspiracy theories (e.g., “How likely is it that billionaire George Soros is behind a hidden plot to 
destabilize the American government, take control of the media, and put the world under his con-
trol?”) including one about the 9/11 terrorist attacks (7-point Likert, from 1 [extremely unlikely] 
to 7 [extremely likely], M = 3.83, SD = 1.57, α = .91). Three of the items, including the item about 
the 9/11 attacks, were adapted from the ANES (2012), while the rest were adapted from Oliver and 
Wood (2014).
Hofstede Cultural Values
The next series of measures were the Hofstede cultural value scale (Yoo, Donthu, & Lenartowicz, 
2011). It comprises five dimensions pertaining to all cultural values from Hosftede’s model except 
for Indulgence, including a total of 26 items from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Power Distance (e.g., “People in higher positions should avoid social interaction with people in 
lower positions”) comprised five items (M = 2.29, SD = 1.18, α = .93), Uncertainty Avoidance (e.g., 
“Rules and regulations are important because they inform me of what is expected of me”) five items 
(M = 4.02, SD = .69, α = .82), Masculinity (e.g., “It is more important for men to have a profes-
sional career than it is for women.”) four items (M = 2.77, SD = 1.22, α =  .89), and Long-Term 
Orientation (e.g., “Working hard for success in the future”) six items (M = 4.14, SD = .60, α = .79). 
This scale had a final dimension assessing collectivism, which we thus reversed to obtain a measure 
of Individualism (e.g., “Individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group”; five items; M = 4.76, 
SD = .94, α = .90). However, Indulgence was not part of this scale, rendering it impossible to test our 
hypotheses regarding that sixth cultural value.
Ideological Orientation
At the end of the survey, along with the demographics, two items were included to measure par-
ticipants’ political ideology (7-point Likert, from 1 [very liberal] to 7 [very conservative], M = 3.69, 
SD = 1.86), which we also used to compute a political extremism score (M = 1.57, SD = 1.02), and 
participants’ religion (categorical, 19.7% atheists).
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Demographics
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their yearly income (from 1 [less than $10,000] to 
12 [more than $150,000], Median = 4 [$30,000–39,999]), education level (from 1 [less than high 
school] to 7 [doctorate], Median = 5, [4 years degree]), race (30.3% nonwhite), gender, and age.
Analytic Strategy
This time, we chose to run Pearson correlations to test our hypotheses given the consequent 
number of measures (limiting the number of tests of type I errors) and to rerun them adjusting for 
potential confounds (demographics, ideology). Across our three studies, all tests were two-tailed.
Results
Correlation Analyses
Pearson correlations between our three conspiracy indicators and our five value scores were 
computed (due to their differences in Likert scaling, all variables were Z-transformed; see Table 3). 
In line with Hypothesis 1 and contrary to Study 2a and 2b’s results, Power Distance was strongly and 
positively associated with GCBS (r = .47, p < .001), CMQ (r = .18, p < .001) and specific conspiracy 
beliefs scale (SCBS) (r = .56, p < .001) scores. Replicating the results of Study 2a and in line with 
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, Individualism was negatively linked with GCBS (r = −.29, p < .001), CMQ 
(r = −.14, p = .011) and SCBS (r = −.31, p < .001) scores and Uncertainty Avoidance was positively 
Table 2. Regression Models of CT According to Hofstede’s Six Cultural Values Adjusted for HDI (Study 2a, Binary 
Logistic, N = 12,255, Outcome = 9/11 CT Rates; Study 2b, OLS, N = 30,994, Outcome = CMQ Scores)
Study 2a
Model Parameters
p d[95% CI]a (SE) t df OR 95% CI
Hofstede values
PD (H1) −.08 (.11) .70 17 .92 [.73, 1.17] −.05 [−.17, .09] .49
ID (H2) −.36 (.13) 2.71 17 .70* [.53, .92] −.20 [−.35, −.05] .015
MS (H3) .51 (.20) 2.64 17 1.67* [1.11, 2.52] .28 [.06, .51] .017
UA (H4) .54 (.17) 3.15 17 1.72** [1.20, 2.46] .30 [.10, .50] .006
LT (H5) −.57 (.18) 3.17 17 .57** [.39, .83] −.31 [−.51, −.10] .006
IN (H6) −.40 (.13) 2.96 17 .67** [.51, .89] −.22 [−.37, −.06] .009
Covariates
HDI .20 (.25) .82 17 1.22 [.73, 2.04] .11 [−.17, .39] .43
Study 2b SE t df b 95% CI
Hofstede values
PD (H1) .24 .67 18 −.16 [−.66, .34] .52
ID (H2) .16 2.76 18 −.45* [−.79, −.11] .013
MS (H3) .10 6.49 18 .66*** [.44, .87] <.001
UA (H4) .23 .24 18 .06 [−.43, .54] .81
LT (H5) .10 1.23 18 −.12 [−.34, .09] .23
IN (H6) .16 .62 18 .10 [−.24, .44] .54
Covariates
HDI .22 .23 18 −.05 [−.52, .42] .82
Note: OR = odds ratio, SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval. HDI = Human Development Index; PD = Power Distance; 
ID = Individualism; MS = Masculinity; UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; LT = Long-Term Orientation; IN = Indulgence.
*p < .05; ***p < .001.
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linked with GCBS (r = .24, p < .001), CMQ (r = .14, p = .008) and SCBS (r = .14, p = .008) scores, as 
Masculinity displayed the same predicted pattern GCBS (r = .29, p < .001), CMQ (r = .55, p < .001) 
and SCBS (r = .60, p < .001).
However, contrary to Hypothesis 5 and to Study 2a’s results, Long-Term Orientation was posi-
tively associated with CMQ (r = .22, p < .001) scores while it did not correlate with both the GCBS 
(r = .04, p = .49) and the SCBS (r = .08, p = .14). This last result replicates the positive but nonsignif-
icant association between LTO measured at the nation level and CMQ scores observed in Study 2b.
Robustness Checks
Given the number of tests (n = 28), we adjusted our results using a Bonferroni correction. The 
correction showed that the vast majority of correlations were not likely due to type I errors, although 
the links between Individualism and CMQ scores, Uncertainty Avoidance and GCBS, SCBS scores 
all displayed p-values > .10. Also, because previous research shows that religiousness, race, gender, 
income, education, political ideology, and extremism are all predictive of conspiracy beliefs (see 
Douglas et al., 2017), we ran partial correlation analyses between our variables of interest controlling 
for those factors. Correlations between our constructs remained quasi-identical except for the link 
between Individualism and CMQ scores (though still negative it dropped to r = −.08, p = .17). Full-
adjusted correlation matrix can be found in the online supporting information.
Discussion
In this final study, we were able to replicate the links observed between Individualism, 
Masculinity, and conspiracist beliefs on three different CT measures at the individual level. This 
bolstered our confidence in the existence of a link between those three values and adherence to 
CT, although the link between Individualism and CMQ scores was not robust to both adjustment 
and correction, which warrants further investigation. Power Distance emerged for the first time as 
positively linked with our CT measures, as predicted by Hypothesis 1 but unlike in Studies 1, 2a, 
and 2b, which found no such links between Power Distance and CT measures. Also, the SCBS pre-
sented respondents with conspiratorial claims without any alternative viewpoints, which may bias 
participants’ responses (see Clifford, Kim, & Sullivan, 2019). In fact, recent research suggests that 
measures of CTs involving contextual knowledge about the events might provide inflated numbers 
due to measurement artifacts (Sutton & Douglas, 2020). Finally, an important limitation pertains to 
the psychometric properties of both the GCBS and the CMQ because there is no currently available 
data to demonstrate that either of these measures are cross-culturally invariant.
Meta-analysis of Studies 1, 2a, 2b and 3
In order to provide a summary of the results of our four studies, we performed a short me-
ta-analysis using ESCI software (Cumming, 2012) on the Pearson correlations between Hofstede’s 
values and CT measures (Figure 1). For Studies 1, 2a, and 2b, we computed the correlation coeffi-
cients between measures aggregated at the country level, resulting in a drastic shrinkage in sample 
size. Despite this power loss, CT measures displayed positive links with Masculinity, r = .39, 95% 
CI = [.18; .59], and correlated negatively with Individualism, r = –.31, 95% CI = [–.47; –.15], repli-
cating our prior findings. Surprisingly, this analysis also revealed a positive association between CTs, 
Power Distance, r = .41, 95% CI = [.20; .63] and Uncertainty Avoidance, r = .18, 95% CI = [.12; .24], 
which was in line with our expectations. Meta-analytic estimates for Long-Term Orientation, r = .09, 
95% CI = [–.01; .19], and Indulgence, r = –.25, 95% CI = [–.51; .02], were inconclusive, just like in 
our previous studies.
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General Discussion
The present results provide support for the unique predictive power of cultural values on CT 
belief. Masculinity and collectivism were robust positive predictors of CT belief across countries, 
operationalizations, and levels of measurement. These findings were expected and perfectly in line 
with the current literature on CTs, pointing at a propensity of competitive contexts to generate in-
creased social vigilance and suspicion, especially in collectivistic contexts (Liu et al., 2019; Mashuri 
& Zaduqisti, 2015; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013). Furthermore, the replicated negative associations 
between individualism and CTs add another layer of cross-cultural evidence for the existence of 
an evolved mechanism of malevolent coalitions detection at play behind CTs (van Prooijen & van 
Vugt, 2018). As regards other cultural values, the inconsistent pattern of results suggests that further 
research is needed to determine whether their links with CT beliefs is spurious or only valid for 
specific types of CTs.
For instance, it was expected from the literature that a robust link would be found between 
Uncertainty Avoidance and CTs, but our empirical findings suggested otherwise. In fact, Uncertainty 
Avoidance displayed small correlations with our CTs measures in Study 3 and was strongly asso-
ciated with CT beliefs about the 9/11 (Study 2a). It was therefore surprising to observe no associ-
ation between Uncertainty Avoidance and CMQ scores at the nation level (Studies 1, 2b). Similar 
results were obtained regarding Power Distance. Yet, both values did display substantial positive 
associations with CT measures in the meta-analysis—as theoretically expected. This discrepancy 
may be due to the fact that our studies at the nation level were performed using regression models, 
which provide estimates adjusting for other cultural values, unlike the meta-analysis (which relied 
on correlations).
In a similar vein, the negative correlations between Long-Term Orientation and CTs measured at 
the nation level from Study 2a did not replicate in Study 2b and were reversed in Study 3 (at the indi-
vidual level). These differences in results according to measurement level and measure type might be 
attributable to ecological fallacy (Freedman, 1999) or stimulus sampling (Wells & Windschitl, 1999) 
related issues and reflect the need for further investigations.
Yet the present studies highlighted a potent role of masculinity and collectivism in shaping CTs 
and open the way for studying the cultural processes at play behind them. In addition to this theo-
retical contribution, we think they might hold applied value for fighting against CTs. For instance, if 
collectivism is indeed a driving force behind CTs, then interventions aiming at promoting analytical 
Table 3. Summary of Correlation Analyses Between Individual-Level Hofstede Values and Conspiracy Beliefs Measures 
(N = 350; Study 3)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. PD – – – – – – – –
2. ID −.49*** – – – – – – –
3. MS .65*** −.41*** – – – – – –
4. UA −.01 −.21*** .08 – – – – –
5. LT −.20*** −.06 −.08 .48*** – – – –
6. CMQ .18*** −.14* .29*** .24*** .22*** – – –
7. GCBS .47*** −.29*** .55*** .14** .04 .72*** – –
8. SCBS .56*** −.31** .60*** .14** .05 .62*** .89*** –
Note: Numbers represent Pearson correlation coefficients. PD = Power Distance; ID = Individualism; MS = Masculinity; 
UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; LT = Long-Term Orientation; CMQ = Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire; GCBS = Generic 
Conspiracy Beliefs Scale; SCTS = Specific Conspiracy Beliefs Scale.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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thinking skills might fail because of adverse cultural contexts and may be improved by including a 
component designed to prime individualistic values (such as moralized rationality for oneself, which 
decreases CTs; Adam-Troian, Caroti, Arciszewski, & Ståhl, 2019; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018). 
Similarly, if masculinity predicts CTs through increased competitiveness, specific interventions 
Figure 1. Forest plots of Person correlations between CT measures and values. The six lines represent respectively Study 1, 
Study 2a, Study 2b, Study 3 CMQ, Study 3 GCBS, and Study 3 SCBS (note: Indulgence was not included in Study 3).
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focusing on increasing social cohesion—such as promoting group activities and intergroup contact 
(Mousa, 2020; Pagotto, Visintin, De Iorio, & Voci, 2013)—or prosocial traits among the target public 
might indirectly affect CTs.
That being said, our investigation can greatly benefit from studies with more varied paradigms 
and a larger pool of countries, using modified priming methods from the culture-as-situated cogni-
tion approach (see Oyserman, 2016) to assess the causal impact of culture on CT (along with medi-
ating-moderating processes). Also, it must be noted that this first exploratory investigation relied on 
associations between “broad” cultural constructs which links with CT may be very straightforwardly 
deduced (e.g., Uncertainty Avoidance). Therefore, we propose that subsequent research should be 
conducted to propose a more refined theoretical analysis of the links between cultural values and CT 
by taking into account more specific constructs such as relational mobility (Schug et al., 2010) or 
tightness-looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011).
In line with this, finer grained investigations will be needed to identify which components of 
cultural values are linked with CT. For instance, while it is true that individualistic values are linked 
with more analytical reasoning styles, this is not systematic. In fact, individual self-construal lev-
els are highly correlated with individual narcissism (Konrath, Bushman, & Grove, 2009) which is 
known to be a positive predictor of adherence to CT (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & de Zavala, 2016). 
This should lead us to consider that subcomponents of cultural values might differentially predict 
adherence to CT.
Conclusion
In sum, our studies provide robust preliminary evidence that cultural contexts are associated 
with variation in CT beliefs. It lends credence to prior theories that country-level factors may predict 
some CTs above and beyond individual difference factors (e.g., Hart & Graether, 2018). The present 
contribution can serve to encourage future research about the mechanisms through which CT beliefs 
are culturally shaped and reflected in situationally cued mindsets within given populations. This shift 
of focus from individual to more cultural contextual factors should allow for an integrative and multi-
level understanding of the processes underlying CT beliefs for both theoretical and applied purposes.
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